

(4) The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current weakness or vulnerability.

(5) The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the foreign relations of the United States.

(6) The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates to no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could cause damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.

(7) The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to the detriment of the national security of the United States.

(c) Declassification of information that reveals the identities of clandestine human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence for that purpose.

(d) The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/CSS to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information are:

(1) *COMSEC documents and materials.*

(i) If records or materials in this category are found in agency files that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the following address: Director, National Security Agency, Attn: Director of Policy (Q4), Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.

(ii) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other documents by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before declassification.

(2) *SIGINT information.* (i) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is in the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be declassified if retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule. If the material

must be retained, it shall be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic review for declassification.

(ii) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before any declassification.

§158.12 Department of State areas of interest.

(a) Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable areas, or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.

(b) Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.

(c) Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization of American States (OAS)).

(d) Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to, military facilities.

(e) Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

(f) Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in contingencies.

(g) Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign government information.

§158.13 Central Intelligence Agency areas of interest.

(a) Cryptologic, cryptographic, or SIGINT. (Information in this category shall continue to be forwarded to the NSA/CSS in accordance with §158.11(d). The NSA/CSS shall arrange for necessary coordination.)

(b) Counterintelligence.

(c) Special access programs

(d) Information that identifies clandestine organizations, agents, sources, or methods.

(e) Information on personnel under official or nonofficial cover or revelation of a cover arrangement.

(f) Covertly obtained intelligence reports and the derivative information